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PERILS OF THE OPEN ROAD
William Lane Craig and David P. Hunt

Open theists deny that God knows future contingents. Most open theists
justify this denial by adopting the position that there are no future contingent truths to be known. In this paper we examine some of the arguments
put forward for this position in two recent articles in this journal, one by
Dale Tuggy and one by Alan Rhoda, Gregory Boyd, and Thomas Belt. The
arguments concern time, modality, and the semantics of ‘will’ statements.
We explain why we find none of these arguments persuasive. This wide road
leads only to destruction.

When the course of events can go in more than one direction, given present
conditions, does God know which way it will go? Open theists deny that
God has knowledge of such “future contingents.” They are prompted in
large part by an estimable concern to safeguard human and divine freedom. This is a concern that we share. What we do not share with open
theists is their conviction that divine foreknowledge must be restricted in
order to make the world safe for genuine free agency. God’s foreknowledge, we believe, does not annul what would otherwise have been a free
action, and denying foreknowledge does not secure for foreknown actions
a freedom that was not otherwise in jeopardy.
A growing number of philosophers appear to think differently. Two
recent defenses of open theism in this journal—one by Dale Tuggy and
the other co-authored by Alan Rhoda, Gregory Boyd, and Tom Belt—provide evidence of the increasing attention and support that open theism
is attracting in the philosophical literature.1 Despite the diversity of our
own viewpoints on a number of issues related to divine omniscience,2 we
are united in regarding the trend toward open theism as lamentable, and
indeed, a bit baffling. In the following pages we explain why we believe

1
Alan R. Rhoda, Gregory A. Boyd, and Thomas G. Belt, “Open Theism, Omniscience,
and the Nature of the Future,” Faith and Philosophy 23 (October 2006), 432–459; Dale Tuggy,
“Three Roads to Open Theism,” Faith and Philosophy 24 (January 2007), 28–51.
2
William Craig is an A-theorist, presentist, and Molinist, who holds that God is in time
(since Creation) and endorses an Ockhamist solution to the problem of theological fatalism,
which he regards as reducible to logical or future-truth fatalism. David Hunt is tempted
by the B-theory and perdurantism; he is an anti-Molinist who holds that God is not in time
and rejects the Ockhamist solution to the problem of theological fatalism, which he regards
as irreducible to the problem of logical or future-truth fatalism.
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that the arguments offered by Tuggy and Rhoda et al. should not persuade
anyone to venture down the road to open theism.
Three Roads to Open Theism
We begin with Dale Tuggy’s article, since he provides a useful map of the
logical territory on which he locates the positions he wishes to discuss.
This map displays “three roads to open theism.” We think that Tuggy’s
roadmap is most perspicuously read as follows.
The three roads result from a series of forks, with the direction taken
at each fork determined by the answer given to a certain yes-no question.
The first question is,
Does God know future contingents?
The answer to this question determines whether one is heading in the
direction of open theism to begin with. If this question is answered in the
affirmative, the traveler is not an open theist; if in the negative, he is an
open theist.3 Tuggy’s interest is in mapping the further route of someone
who opts for open theism at this first fork. (The traditional theist, who
answers this question with a yes, may also face a complex road ahead, but
charting it isn’t part of Tuggy’s project in this paper.)
But why wouldn’t a presumptively omniscient deity know future contingents? There appear to be two main options here: either there are no
future contingent truths for God to know, or there are future contingent
truths but God (for one reason or another) doesn’t know them. The next
question, then, is,
Are there any future contingent truths?
The answer to this question, following a negative answer to the question
whether God knows future contingents, appears to determine whether
the God of open theism can qualify as omniscient, at least in any straightforward sense. An affirmative answer to this second question entails that
he is not omniscient, since there will then be truths (namely, all the truths
about the contingent future) that God does not know. Tuggy calls this the
“narrow road” to open theism, since few open theists endorse it.4

3
Of course one would have to satisfy some other conditions as well (like being an indeterminist and a theist!). So think of this fork in the road as coming after earlier forks; one
doesn’t have access to this one unless one took the “theist” turnoff earlier (and perhaps
some others as well).
4
William Hasker is Tuggy’s principal representative of the narrow road. Hasker insists
that the narrow road allows for divine omniscience, but he has to reconceive “omniscience”
in making his case—hence the qualification, “at least in any straightforward sense,” two
sentences earlier. See his God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 186–188. Peter van Inwagen endorses a similar position in “What Does an
Omniscient Being Know about the Future?,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, vol.
1, ed. Jonathan Kvanvig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 216–230. Another narrowroader is Richard Swinburne; see his Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), 22–26.
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Here the road branches again. If there are no future contingent truths,
this may be either (i) because all future contingent statements are false, or
(ii) because they have no truth-value at all. Those who eschew the narrow
road must therefore answer this question:
Are future contingent statements then false?
An affirmative answer allows one to accept, while a negative answer requires one to reject, the Principle of Bivalence, according to which every
proposition has either the truth-value True or the truth-value False. The
affirmative answer is tempting because it saves one the trouble of contesting the widely accepted Principle of Bivalence with respect to future
contingent statements. People in a hurry to get to open theism might veer
onto this “short cut,” as Tuggy terms it. This is the route elected by Rhoda
et al. The negative answer, committing one to the rejection of Bivalence
with respect to future contingent statements, is Tuggy’s wide road.
Tuggy’s paper is a defense of the wide road, not only against fellow
open theists who opt for the narrow road or the short cut, but also, more
importantly, against classical theists who never got on the road to open
theism in the first place because they answered the question, “Does God
know future contingents?” in the affirmative. Since we have no stake in
the intramural debate among open theists, we shall ignore Tuggy’s critique of the short cut to open theism, leaving it to Rhoda et al. to resist, if
they can, the force of his criticisms.5
Tuggy’s principal strategy in the debate with classical theists is to present a positive case on behalf of the wide road, noting intuitions about
future contingents that it allegedly satisfies and addressing worries that
have been raised against it. Rhoda et al. take a similar approach on behalf
of the “short cut.” We shall examine both of their positive cases in subsequent sections of this paper. But first, we need to remind ourselves that
5
Tuggy’s critique of his fellow openists agrees with ours at certain points, but not where
it draws on his radical alternative to the “short cut.” Given the incoherence of his interpretation of the tree model of reality (to be explained below), Tuggy’s attempt to justify
the sweeping logical reforms he himself proposes as indigenous to the wide road to open
theism—including denial of the Principle of Bivalence, construal of “¬,” “∨,” and “&” as
non-truth-functional connectives (or, at least, as not expressive of certain simple negations,
disjunctions, and conjunctions), and even rejection of Tarski’s T-schema for truth—is in
vain. Nor does the conjunction of an A-theory of time with causal indeterminism imply
the reforms Tuggy proposes, as he seems to think. Tuggy’s breath-taking reforms to classical logic go even beyond intuitionistic logic, which is itself regarded by the vast majority of contemporary logicians as a deviant and messy distraction. He also errs in taking
defenders of the Principle of Bivalence to assert the logical equivalence of any true tensed
statement and a tenseless version of the statement. This assertion is obviously false, since
not every true tensed statement is, like tenseless truths, true at all times: tensed statements
typically change truth values over time. The point, rather, is that for any tensed truth one
can formulate an analogous tenseless statement which will be always, if ever, true. So, for
example, prior to Columbus’s landing in the New World it is true that “In 1492 Columbus
lands in the New World,” in which case it is hard to see why the tensed statement “Columbus will land in the New World,” asserted prior to 1492, would not be true. Tuggy’s denial
of the omnitemporal truth of tenseless truths is predicated, once more, upon his flawed
understanding of the tree model of reality.
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there is a negative case as well, and it contributes as much as any positive
case to explaining the turn toward open theism.
Why would an otherwise orthodox Christian philosopher come to
deny that God knows future contingents? The answer, of course, is that
there is a famous argument to the effect that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with future contingents, and hence with robust free agency (assuming that this requires contingency); preserving free agency therefore
requires abandoning divine foreknowledge. Let’s call this argument for
the incompatibility of free agency and divine foreknowledge simply (and
unimaginatively) “The Argument.”6 The papers by Tuggy and Rhoda et
al. do not directly address The Argument, but they do presuppose its cogency; after all, hardly anyone would be traveling down any of the three
roads toward open theism if The Argument were regarded as unsound.7
We shall also avoid a direct engagement with The Argument, about which
so much has already been written. But it is the elephant in the room, and
its presence must be acknowledged. We shall confine ourselves to just a
couple of points.
First, The Argument is strongly counterintuitive. Mere foreknowledge—
in contrast, say, to causal determinism, or to a sci-fi scenario in which we’re
controlled by Martians via tiny chips implanted in our brains—just does not seem
like the sort of thing which, when added to an action that otherwise satisfies one’s favorite conditions for free agency, could really render that action
unfree. For this reason, we believe that an unbiased inquirer would be well
within his epistemic rights in regarding The Argument as setting forth a
philosophical puzzle awaiting a solution rather than a serious brief on behalf of the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom.8
Second, once all its hidden assumptions are identified, The Argument
turns out to be quite complex. There are many points at which it could go
off the rails. We have our own favorite ways of rebutting The Argument,
and in fact disagree about which way is best; but there’s an embarrassment
of riches here for The Argument’s critics.9 Open theists have tried to imbue
6
Here is one way to articulate The Argument. Suppose God knew before you were born
that you would do A at T (where your doing A at T would otherwise be regarded as paradigmatically free). Necessarily, if God knew before you were born that you would do A at
T, then you will do A at T. But it’s no longer possible for God not to know that you will do A
at T (given the supposition that he did know this). Therefore it’s no longer possible for you
not to do A at T.
7
At least no one would do so on philosophical grounds, which are the ones at issue in the
two papers under discussion. Of course some open theists have come to their position on
scriptural grounds. We think the scriptural case for open theism is also mistaken, and we’ve
both addressed it in print, Craig in The Only Wise God, rep. ed. (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock,
1999), pt. 1, and Hunt in “What Does God Know? The Problems of Open Theism,” in Contending with Christianity’s Critics, ed. Paul Copan and William Lane Craig (Nashville: B&H
Publishing, 2009), 265–282. But this debate lies outside our agenda in this paper.
8
For a defense of this position, see David P. Hunt, “What Is the Problem of Theological
Fatalism?,” International Philosophical Quarterly 38 (March 1998), 17–30.
9
Craig, following William of Ockham, denies that the “necessity of the past” applies
to God’s past beliefs about the future, allowing him to reject The Argument’s transfer of
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The Argument with an aura of impregnability so that nipping it in the bud
by denying the problematic foreknowledge in the first place will seem the
only viable strategy for preserving human freedom. Anyone coming to
this issue unfamiliar with the extensive literature on The Argument might
assume that this represents the consensus of the philosophical community
and infer that the traditional position on foreknowledge bears the burden
of proof in the contest with open theism. But anyone who is familiar with
the literature will recognize this as a fundamental misreading of the dialectical situation.10
In sum, The Argument is intuitively dubious, and there are many junctures at which it can and has been doubted. It is important to remind the
reader that there is a “road not taken,” and it avoids all the difficulties
besetting the road(s) to open theism.
Tuggy thinks The Argument’s role is exaggerated, for the following
reason. The Argument’s challenge to divine foreknowledge is based on a
complex argument invoking robust free will. But there is also a simple argument against divine foreknowledge based on the denial of Bivalence with
respect to future contingent statements: if some future contingent statements
are neither true nor false, there will be corresponding gaps in God’s foreknowledge, which must again be less than exhaustive. Tuggy prefers this
latter argument. (One is tempted to call this Tuggy’s own “short cut”!)
Tuggy claims, on behalf of this argument, that the denial of Bivalence
with respect to future contingent statements is “strongly rooted in common sense” and “reflects the way that nearly all of us think . . . before
committing to some theory.”11 Here nothing more is needed to motivate
the wide road than untutored common sense. This claim seems very dubious to us. Indeed, Tuggy himself, on the very next page, recognizes
“that common sense sanctions the belief that we all face a unique future,
which could in principle be ‘viewed’ by God or even a psychic.”12 Such
an admission is flatly incompatible with his previous claim. Equally puzzling is Tuggy’s assertion that the statement that some propositions about the
necessity to divinely foreknown actions, while Hunt, following Augustine, accepts the
transfer of necessity but denies that it undermines free agency, since divine foreknowledge
does not cause or explain foreknown actions. For Craig’s position on The Argument, see
his Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism: Omniscience, Studies
in Intellectual History 19 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990). Hunt’s response to The Argument may
be found in his “On Augustine’s Way Out,” Faith and Philosophy 16 (January 1999), 1–26,
reprinted in Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge, ed. John Martin Fischer and Patrick Todd
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). See also Hunt’s “Freedom, Foreknowledge, and
Frankfurt,” in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, ed. David Widerker and Michael McKenna (Burlington, VT: Ashgate
Publishing Co., 2003) 159–183.
10
An excellent summary of the current state of the debate and a sampling of the many
responses` that have been made to The Argument may be found in Linda Zagzebski’s “Recent Work on Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 1st
ed., ed. Robert Kane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
11
Tuggy, “Three Roads to Open Theism,” 31.
12
Ibid., 32.
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future are presently neither true nor false is less “controversial and unilluminating” than the statement that humans have libertarian free will.13 After all,
Tuggy and other wide-roaders don’t maintain that it’s the sheer futurity of
future events that renders future contingent statements neither true nor
false, but their contingency; if there were no future contingents, all propositions about the future would be presently either true or false. For Tuggy,
then, some propositions about the future are presently neither true nor
false only because humans have libertarian free will, quantum mechanics
is indeterministic, and so on—that is, because we live in this kind of world
rather than some other kind of world. To the extent that our living in this
kind of world is “controversial and unilluminating,” how can something
(the denial of Bivalence) that is explanatorily dependent on our living in this
kind of world be less “controversial and unilluminating” than what it’s
dependent on? Tuggy’s short cut represents a false economy.
As we’ve noted, neither Tuggy nor Rhoda et al. press the negative case
for open theism, based on The Argument. Perhaps they think that that
particular debate has already been won by their side, or that there is little
more they can add to it, or that it’s of limited effectiveness in moving others—for example, people who think that the openist critique of classical
foreknowledge has some force but who believe that open theism is even
worse—in the direction of open theism. But whatever reason the authors
might have for neglecting the negative case grounded in The Argument,
it’s the positive case that they pursue, and it’s to their positive case that we
now turn, beginning with their understanding of the future.
Open Theism and Branching Models of the Future
It’s striking that in an article devoted to elucidating “the Nature of the
Future,” Rhoda et al. never define or explicate the key term “the future.”
Indeed, Rhoda et al.’s characterization of the two views about the future
which are the focus of their attention is so confused that it’s difficult even
to know where to begin in one’s commentary. We may as well begin with
the very first sentence of their abstract: on the view they reject, which
they call the settled future view (SFV), “the future is settled in the sense
that it is exhaustively and truly describable in terms of what either will or
will not obtain.”14 By contrast, on their preferred view, which they call the
open future view (OFV), “the future is open in the sense that a complete,
true description of it must include reference to what might and might not
obtain.”15
Immediately one is puzzled because these two ways of describing the
future do not seem to be mutually exclusive. To say that the future is truly
describable in terms of what either will or will not be seems to be an affirmation that according to SFV the Principle of Bivalence holds with respect
Ibid., 31.
Rhoda et al., “Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future,” 432.
15
Ibid.
13
14
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to future-tense statements—otherwise, why include “will not be” in the
characterization? But Rhoda et al. will later themselves affirm the Principle of Bivalence with respect to such statements.16 So there is no point of
contrast there.
What about the claim that on SFV the future is exhaustively so describable? This seems to be the affirmation that there are no truth-value gaps
among future-tense statements, again a position to which Rhoda et al. (in
contrast to Tuggy) themselves adhere, given their commitment to Bivalence. On the other hand, if this claim is meant to affirm that according to
SFV only de facto statements about events which will occur are true, then
partisans of the so-called settled view are not at all committed to it. There
is, for example, the moral dimension of events to be considered: certain
events ought or ought not to occur. The execution of an innocent man
will occur tomorrow, but it ought not to. An exhaustive description of the
future must include such prescriptive truths. Or consider the modality of
events which will occur. Some events which will occur may be causally
necessary, whereas others will occur contingently. Though the latter will
in fact occur, they will not occur necessarily and so could fail to happen.
An exhaustive description of the future must also include such modal
truths. But then once again any contrast with the so-called open view
evaporates. For although “might” is a terminus technicus in counterfactual
semantics, Rhoda et al. use the word in this context merely to indicate
causal contingency.17 Ironically, then, we may hold that the future is both
“settled” and “open”; there seems to be no contrast between the two views.
But Rhoda et al. go on to claim that if the future is exhaustively settled,
it “cannot be changed,” whereas on the open view the future “can . . .
change as matters which are open become settled.”18 It’s unclear what is
being claimed here. At one level it is a familiar analytic truth that the
future cannot be changed. In this sense to change the future would be
to bring it about that an event which will occur will not occur, which is
logically absurd. This analytic truth is independent of so-called settled or
open views of the future. At another level, one can “change” the future
in that future contingents can fail to occur and one can act in such a way
as to prevent their occurrence. Again, this sense of changing the future
is common to both views. These are familiar points which need not be
elaborated.
So in what sense is the future changeable on one view and not on the
other? Rhoda et al. provide a clue to their meaning when they say that on
the standard “settled” view, “the set of truths about the future is fixed and
unchangeable,” in contrast to their view, according to which, as we have
seen, the future can change “as matters which are open become settled.”19
Ibid., 450–454.
Ibid., 436.
18
Ibid., 432.
19
Ibid., 433, 432.
16

17
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The idea, we take it, is that on the “open” view, since the only future-tense
statements that are true are those describing events which are causally
determined to occur, then as causally determinative conditions for some
event become actual, statements about that event switch truth values, in
Rhoda et al.’s view, from false to true. Future events themselves do not
change, since, given their assumption of presentism, future events do
not exist. Rather what changes is the truth values presently possessed by
future-tense statements. In this Pickwickian sense, the future changes.
By contrast on the standard SFV view, we’re told, the set of future-tense
truths is fixed and unchangeable.
Now at one level, waiving set-theoretical paradoxes,20 it is trivially
true that the set of future-tense truths is fixed and unchangeable, since
sets have their members essentially. On the “open” view, neither does
the set of future-tense truths change. Rather at different times different
sets of future-tense statements are true, in the sense that all of a given
set’s members are true. But then it’s evident that this is also the case on
the standard view. At different times there will be different sets of true
future-tense statements and a unique set at every time. So on SFV, the
future also changes in the Pickwickian sense. So the contrast between
the standard view and the open view lies not in the supposed changeability of the future, but in which future-tense statements are true or false.
On the standard view there are among all true future-tense statements
future contingent statements, whereas on the “open” view there are no
true future contingent statements. The latter are all of them either truthvalueless (Tuggy) or false (Rhoda et al.).
Curiously, then, on Rhoda et al.’s view the future is, in fact, completely
settled “semantically,” as they put it. Whereas on Tuggy’s view futurecontingent propositions represent truth-value gaps, on Rhoda et al.’s view
there is nothing left to be settled, no gaps at all to be filled, for, in accord
with the Principle of Bivalence, future contingent propositions are uniformly false. The future no more changes on the “open” view than on
the standard view, for in both cases the change consists wholly in the
truth-values presently possessed by future-tense statements. The whole
difference between the views lies simply in which statements are presently true. The distinctive thesis of the openness position as defended
by Rhoda et al. is that future-tense statements change their present truth
value, not only from true to false, but from false to true. All the talk contrasting openness and settledness turns out to be misleading rhetoric.
Rhoda et al. compound the confusion by their equivocal interpretation of branching diagrams of the future.21 They conflate two quite different interpretations of such diagrams: as representations of the ontology
20
There cannot be a set of all future-tense truths, just as there cannot be a set of all
truths. One should employ universal quantification to speak of all future-tense truths rather than set theoretical concepts.
21
The unnumbered diagrams appear on 434 and 436 of their paper.
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of space-time events and as representations of the causal modality of such
events. They introduce such diagrams as depicting “a complete sequence
of events stretching all the way back and all the way forward” which is
the history of the actual world, along with other causally possible future
histories branching off.

Already confusion is evident. If the diagram exhibits real events, then
the diagram is a futile attempt to represent at once both a tenseless and
a tensed perspective on the world. If the diagram is a tenseless representation of temporal moments or events, then there should be no present
moment designated and so no branches. If the diagram is a tensed representation, then there should be no solid line representing the sequence of
future events, since on presentism there are no such events. As it is, the
diagram represents an incoherence, not the “settled” view of the future.
The confusion is augmented by their next diagram, meant to illustrate
the open future view.

The diagram appears to be tensed, for a unique present is denominated
and there is no sequence of future events. But then why is the past depicted as a solid line? The diagram depicts, not presentism, but what Rhoda
et al. later call the “growing universe” view,22 which they say they will
ignore. In any case, the absence in the diagram of a solid line later than the
22

Rhoda et al., “Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future,” 447.
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present in no way illustrates either the failure of Bivalence for future contingent propositions or the falsity of such propositions, for the diagram
does not depict the truth status of propositions at a time, but the ontology
of events in time.
Rhoda et al. then begin to construe the diagram as a representation
of the causal modal status of events. If an event occurs on all branches,
it is causally determined; if it occurs on none, it is causally impossible; if
it occurs on some but not all, it is causally contingent. But if the diagram
represents the modal status of events, why is there a single line from the
past through the present? If there have been free decisions in the past or
if quantum indeterminacy is ontic, then the past should be branching,
too. The diagram should be a thicket, not a tree. Past events may now be
determinate without being (causally) determined. The mere passage of
time does not remove the causal indeterminacy of an event. Lest Rhoda
et al. insist that the actuality of the past is incompatible with its causal
indeterminacy, then we should remind them, as Adolf Grünbaum argued
forcefully long ago in a classic paper, that the actuality of the future on the
B-Theory of time is in no way incompatible with the quantum indeterminacy of future events.23
Rhoda et al. might rejoin that on presentism backward causation is impossible, so that the diagram accurately depicts at least the causal closedness of the past as opposed to the future. The problem is that causal closedness/openness is not the same as causal determinacy/indeterminacy.
Events which lie on every future branch are causally determined, but they
are still open as of the present to causal influences. If there were retrocausation, say, via tachyons, then even causally determined past events
would still be open to causal influence. In any case, interpreting the diagram as a representation of which events are, as of the present, open to
causal influence does nothing to suggest that there are no true future contingent propositions.
All of Rhoda et al.’s confusions come home to roost in their summary:
Importantly, if the OFV is correct, then the future can and does change.
When time’s advance brings us to a node on the tree of causally possible
futures, a decision point is reached at which only one of the branches stemming from that node can be taken. When the decision is made, the other
branches are “pruned off,” as it were, and fall out of the realm of causal possibility. Thus, the geometry of the future changes through branch attrition.
A true might and might not proposition becomes false and a false will or will
not proposition becomes true whenever causal possibilities are foreclosed
such that what was causally contingent at one point in time becomes either
causally necessary or causally impossible at a later point.24

23
Adolf Grünbaum, “Is There a Flow of Time or Temporal Becoming?” in Philosophical
Problems of Space and Time, 2d ed., Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1973), 314–329.
24
Rhoda et al., “Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future,” 436.
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Here we see their confusion of future events with future tense statements
about those events, their conflation of two distinct interpretations of tree
diagrams of temporal events, one ontic and the other modal/causal, their
incoherent blend of tenseless and tensed representations of reality, their
idiosyncratic understanding of “might” and “will,” and their confusion of
causal closedness and causal determinacy.
Tuggy, for his part, gives the branching diagram a different interpretation but exhibits a similar confusion of ontology and modality. He begins
with ontology, taking his diagram to be “a linear model of time.”25 It is a
representation of time itself, which has the topological and geometrical
properties of a line.
v
u
t
s
Immediately, the problem arises that Tuggy’s Fig. 1 also tries to exhibit
both a tensed and a tenseless perspective on time, which is incoherent.
For the square node in the diagram represents the present, and yet all
moments of time are depicted as existent. Tuggy then in Fig. 2 introduces
branches to illustrate the openness of the future.
v
u
t
s

A consistent interpretation requires that time itself thus exhibits a branching structure. Tuggy himself will affirm this, later commenting, “In section 4 above I made the point that if one thinks of time as branching in the
future direction, one must hold that some claims about the future are when
made neither true nor false.”26
But Tuggy proceeds to embrace presentism, which subverts the view
that time itself has a branching structure. In a footnote Tuggy admits,
“As I’m a presentist, I don’t believe that there are any such things; the
Tuggy, “Three Roads to Open Theism,” 31.
Ibid., 37 (our emphasis).

25
26
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future and past ‘branch-segments’ in my model aren’t to be thought of as
realities.”27 The branches seem to represent modalities, not time’s topological structure. Rejecting as “incoherent” the idea that “there are now
‘many incompatible futures,’” Tuggy takes the branching structure to
represent “outcomes which are possible given the course of history up
till now. The branch-segments beyond the present represent temporally
possible futures—not all the logically or even the causally possible ones,
but rather, the ones which haven’t been ruled out by what has happened
already together with what is now happening.”28 So Tuggy does not take
the modalities depicted on the diagram to be causal, as Rhoda et al. do;
rather it is a kind of temporal possibility/necessity which is depicted. In
other words, the model aspires to be a diagrammatic representation of
what Alfred Freddoso calls “accidental” possibility and necessity.29
But then the problem with the diagram becomes immediately apparent:
by depicting the past as a single line segment rather than as branching,
it precludes there being any accidentally contingent propositions about
the past. But all libertarians think that some past events are “soft” facts
and that therefore propositions about their occurrence are not at every
later time accidentally necessary—for example, the statement that “Maria
Bach gave birth to the greatest Baroque composer,” which could not have
been accidentally necessary until the Baroque age had come to an end.
Such events fail to be represented anywhere on the diagram. Some theists hold that among past events there are events like God’s believing that
some future contingent will transpire, a prophet’s predicting that some
future contingent event will take place, and God’s promising to do some
action in the future, and that propositions about such events’ having occurred are not, relative to the node of the first fork of the tree diagram,
accidentally necessary. So events such as these also fail to be represented
anywhere on the diagram.
Tuggy goes on to claim that some interesting things “follow from this
picture.”30 Tuggy must mean that if the diagram accurately depicts reality, then some interesting conclusions follow. But then we need some
arguments, such as Rhoda et al. have sought to give, for thinking that the
picture does depict reality accurately. Since many thinkers will find the
diagram to be a misrepresentation or, at best, an incomplete representation of the world, it is a matter of indifference what follows from it, unless
some arguments can be given for its veridicality. Unfortunately, Tuggy
does little more than make vague gestures toward an argument, gestures

Ibid., 50.
Ibid., 33. Cf. his later remark about past and future line segments of the diagram:
“What they represent are events which have been real, and events which will become or
might become real” (Ibid., 50). Obviously, this is not entirely consistent.
29
Alfred J. Freddoso, “Accidental Necessity and Logical Determinism,” Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983), 257–278.
30
Tuggy, “Three Roads to Open Theism,” 33.
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that basically point toward Rhoda et al.’s semantic and metaphysical arguments, to which we shall turn in a moment.31
Tuggy then reverts to speaking of the branching diagram as a model of
time itself, rather than of temporal modalities: “on the branching model of
time there is now no future—no complete future world-segment or branch
which is now such that it will be.”32 Taken as serious metaphysics, this is a
view of time which takes the branches to be literal space-time manifolds
which are pruned off as time passes. This view, which has been defended
by Storrs McCall, is, as Tuggy notes, arguably incoherent.33 It is in any case
bizarre and has not commended itself to many. On presentism, which all
our interlocutors want to affirm, there just are no branches later than the
present, if we take the branches to represent time or event sequences.
Rather the tree model is plausibly construed as a pictorial representation
of modalities, either causal (Rhoda et al.) or temporal (Tuggy).34
In sum, the branching diagram is an attempt to depict, not the structure of time itself, but the temporal modalities of propositions at a given
time. But in that case, simply to assume that the diagram resembles a tree
is to beg the question against certain classical theists. For it is merely to
assume that there are no true temporally contingent past-tense statements
to the effect that God foreknew some future contingent. Both Rhoda et al.
and Tuggy’s use of branching tree diagrams to illustrate and support their
view of the future is thus fundamentally confused.

31
Cf. his statements “Given the openness of the future . . . , there is presently no fact
which could make that statement true or false”; “We hold to the truth-realist intuitions
that a true statement fits reality, and that a false statement misfits with reality” (ibid.,
34). The latter is merely an affirmation of truth as correspondence; the former appears to
sneak in truth-maker theory. When Tuggy says that if an event occurs on some but not all
branches, “then as of now the non-modal statement lacks what it takes to be true, and also
lacks what it takes to be false” (ibid.), he gratuitously assumes that what it takes to be true
is more than correspondence; what it takes is some special kind of truth-makers. In fairness to Tuggy, we must say that “the main thrust” of his argument is merely that “open
theists ought to travel the wide road” rather than other roads to open theism (ibid., 28).
We agree wholeheartedly with that advice. But then the question remains why Christian
philosophers ought to join them on this perilous path. It is left to Rhoda et al. to do the
convincing.
32
Tuggy, “Three Roads to Open Theism,” 33.
33
Storrs McCall, A Model of the Universe, Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); for a critique, see William Lane Craig, critical notice of A Model of the Universe, by Storrs McCall, International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1995), 354–356.
34
Strangely, Tuggy attacks the suggestion that the model depicts modalities. “If we assume that there is (timelessly or now) an actual future, then this suggestion makes perfect
sense. But this is to affirm the linear model of time; there will be, at any time, exactly one
accessible future (though there may be many other logically, causally, and epistemically
possible futures)” (Tuggy, “Three Roads to Open Theism,” 34). This assertion is bewildering. The linearity of time has to do with its topological structure: it is a one dimensional
manifold of points ordered by a betweenness relation. Viewed from a tenseless perspective it looks, well, like a line—there are no branches. In rejecting an interpretation of the
branches like McCall’s and yet in endorsing a branching model, Tuggy must be taking the
branches to depict modalities. By shunning logical, causal, and epistemic construals, he
must be taking the branches to depict temporal modalities, just as he said.
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The Semantic Argument
In addition to presenting a branching model of time, which they believe
will appeal to the uncommitted reader but which we’ve argued to be seriously confused, Rhoda et al. present two arguments for the OFV (open
future view). More specifically, they give two arguments for what they
call “the incompatibility thesis, which says that future contingency is incompatible with a settled future” and hence unavailable to divine foreknowledge. The OFV is alleged to follow from the incompatibility thesis
(or IT) in conjunction with “the contingency thesis, which says that there
are future contingents.”35 Since their audience, like Tuggy’s, is restricted
to those who already accept the contingency thesis, it’s the IT that commands their attention. We look at their so-called “semantic” argument for
IT in this section and their “metaphysical” argument in the next.
The semantic argument concerns the causal force presupposed by the
predictive use of the word ‘will’—e.g., in the sentence, “The Dean will
attend tomorrow’s budget meeting.” Rhoda et al. consider two main options here. What they call the Peircean option “takes the causal force of
will to be maximal. To predict that something will happen, in this sense,
is to say that it causally must happen.”36 So Peirceans, who regard the
future as causally open, must also treat it as semantically open; that is,
they must deny that, “[f]or any possible state of affairs S and any future
time t, it must be and always has been true either that S will obtain at
t or that S will not obtain at t.”37 What they call the Ockhamist option,
on the other hand, “takes will to have no causal force at all. To predict
that something will happen, in this sense, is just to say that it does happen in the future, nothing more.”38 This allows Ockhamists, who agree
with Peirceans in regarding the future as causally open, to treat it as
semantically settled, i.e., such that it “always has been true either that S
will obtain at t or that S will not obtain at t.” The authors’ contention is
that predictive ‘will’ statements should be assigned a Peircean rather
than Ockhamist meaning, and that this settles the controversy in favor
of open theism.39
To this end, the authors set out “to show that either the Ockhamist or
the Peircean position fits more naturally with our colloquial predictive
Rhoda et al., “Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future,” 432.
Ibid., 439.
37
Ibid., 433.
38
Ibid., 439. The authors’ Peircean-Ockhamist distinction comes from Arthur N. Prior,
Past, Present, and Future (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 113–136. We leave it a moot question whether such “Ockhamism” accurately represents the view of either Ockham or his
Anhänger.
39
Tuggy, by contrast (and, in our view, rightly), allows for future contingent sentences
to express both Peircean and Ockhamist propositions, where the latter are regarded by him
(this time, in our view, wrongly) as neither true nor false. The fact that Rhoda et al. attempt
to reach open theism by bypassing Ockhamist propositions altogether may be one reason
Tuggy refers to their road as the “short cut.”
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usage of ‘will.’”40 By this standard, however, it is patently obvious that ‘will’
can express not only a deterministic relation but also, as the authors themselves admit, “a range of indeterministic relations that are compatible with
things turning out otherwise, i.e., where the probability of something’s
occurring is understood to be less than one but greater than zero.”41 If the
standard is colloquial usage, colloquial usage allows for a broad spectrum
of relations, and the Peircean position tolerates only the causally maximal
end of the spectrum, it would seem that Peirceanism cannot even get out
of the starting gate: there is simply no contest between it and Ockhamism.
But then we get this: “While colloquial speech is comfortable with a flexible usage of ‘will,’ relying on context to make clear what kind of force the
term is intended to bear on a given occasion, for philosophical purposes we
need something more precise—a regimented usage that fixes the causal
dimension—so that we can develop a rigorous tense logic.”42 So much, it
would seem, for colloquial usage!
Developing a “rigorous tense logic” which “fixes the causal dimension”
may be an edifying exercise for its own sake, but it won’t advance the authors’ larger argument for open theism unless it applies to all future contingent propositions, and does so in such a way that none are true. Now
if we adopt a Peircean tense logic, to say that something will happen is to
assign it a probability of 1.0; if that something is in fact a future contingent, what was said is false—hence the authors’ affection for the Peircean
position. But on what grounds could all propositions about the future be
treated in this Procrustean way, since the authors themselves concede that
colloquial predictive speech tolerates a wide range of probabilities?
The key move for Rhoda et al. is the appeal to rational assertibility. When
determining the meaning of an utterance, “[t]he principle of charity says
that a person’s claims ought to be interpreted, if the semantic flexibility of
his words and the context allow, in a manner that preserves the rational
assertibility of those claims.” Applying this canon to the predictive use
of “will,” the “degree of causal force we take a future-tense statement to
carry depends on what we think the speaker could have reasonably asserted at the time he made the claim.”43 Rhoda et al. believe they know
what that degree of causal force is:
to genuinely assert at u that “S will obtain at t” is to posit its being the case
at u that S’s obtaining at t is at least probable. But since we’re looking for a
regimented philosophical usage of will that fixes the causal dimension, we
have to settle on a particular probability. . . . The Peircean proposal, which
takes will to have determinative causal force (probability = 1.0), seems to
be the most natural philosophical regimentation of the term’s colloquial
usage. After all, it makes more sense to fix the causal force of the unqualiIbid., 439–440.
Ibid.
42
Rhoda et al., “Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future,” 439.
43
Ibid., 442.
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fied prediction that something will happen at a probability of 1.0 and to use
qualifying words like “probably” when lesser causal force is intended, than
it does to fix the causal force of will at, say, 0.8, which would then require
qualification in both directions.44

So despite the apparent diversity of contexts in which people make predictive statements and the wide range of causal commitments exhibited
in colloquial speech, which seemed to doom the authors’ Peircean project
from the outset, it turns out that it’s the Peircean position, which treats all
truths about the future as noncontingent, that fits best with a charitable
construal of people’s utterances.
The following are just a sampling of the many problems with this argument against future contingent truths.
1. The argument simply begs the question against the traditional position on divine foreknowledge. Rational assertibility is person-relative;
what is rationally assertible for one person may not be rationally assertible for another. This is especially true when the persons in question are
as different in their cognitive capacities as God and human beings. But
the authors’ dismissal of future contingent truths is based entirely on
what they believe to be rationally assertible for human beings; they never so
much as entertain the question of what might be rationally assertible for
God. If God’s omniscience includes future contingent truths, as the tradition maintains, then such truths are rationally assertible for God; to deny
this, on no better grounds than that human beings are not in a position
to rationally assert them, simply presupposes the falsity of the traditional
doctrine of divine foreknowledge.
2. The authors need to show that all predictive “will” statements should
be assigned a Peircean meaning, and rational assertibility is too limited in
its application to perform this omnibus task. Rational assertibility helps
us figure out the most charitable construal to place on an utterance. But
there isn’t always occasion to employ this canon, and when there isn’t, we
have no ground to construe putative future contingent propositions as
noncontingent. Our own utterances provide one obvious context in which
we do not rely on principles of charity to figure out what is being said!
But even when rational assertibility is properly restricted to parsing the
assertions of third parties, we don’t employ it when the person’s meaning
is already clear or subject to clarification. Consider a roulette player who
asserts, “The ball will land on 20.” Since the odds are 1 to 35 against this
outcome, “absent indications that he really believes that the ball is likely to
land on 20,” the authors advise, “we should apply the principle of charity
and try to find a plausible construal in the context that does not have him
44
Ibid., 443. This is a good point at which to draw attention to the authors’ conflation of
probability with causal necessity and contingency. A probability of 1.0 doesn’t imply causal
determinacy. Probability has to do with the expectations of a perfectly rational agent, and
these expectations may be based on something other than causal determinism. A time
traveler, for example, may be certain of the future (it has a probability of 1.0 relative to his
background beliefs) despite its causal indeterminacy.
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claiming something he is not in a position to know or justifiably believe.”45
So suppose we question him about his assertion. “I just know,” he replies.
At some point we have to take this person at his word. There is no opening here for invoking rational assertibility.
3. The best that Rhoda et al. could achieve, even if we discounted the
preceding objections, would be a semantics under which predictive “will”
statements were assigned a sufficiently high probability-value—sufficiently high, by the authors’ lights, to make them rationally assertible.
That would still leave unexplained the egregious leap to a maximal causal
force of 1.0. One consequence of this move, made in the interests of a “rigorous tense logic,” is that many will-statements that would ordinarily be
regarded as true will instead turn out false. Indeed, since the Peircean
semantics holds that “it is strictly true that something will happen if and
only if it is causally determined that it happen,”46 a statement like “An
indeterminate quantum phase transition will occur” is not just false but
logically incoherent, like “John is a married bachelor.” It is ironic, to say
the least, that rational assertibility—a principle of hermeneutical charity—
yields a semantics under which certain statements are more likely to end
up false.
4. As a canon of interpretation, rational assertibility can presuppose
only that people assert propositions they (rationally) believe to be more
probable than not, regardless of their actual probability. So even if we
granted the authors’ astonishing contention that rational assertions
should be assigned a probability of 1.0, there would still be circumstances
in which what are in fact future contingent propositions will be rationally
asserted. Having rigged the roulette wheel, our gambler may rationally
believe that the ball’s landing on 20 is not only probable but guaranteed.
His prediction passes the rational assertibility test. But if a freak martini spill causes the gizmo rigging the wheel to short out, then if the ball
still lands on 20, as it might, what the gambler asserted was a true future
contingent. It’s only by confusing the epistemic with the ontological that
the authors could overlook this obvious problem with their thesis. The
gambler’s belief that the ball will land on 20 is one belief; his belief that
the roulette wheel is rigged and that the ball must land on 20 is another.
The latter is his reason for the former, but these are distinct beliefs, one of
them true and the other false. The authors simply conflate the conditions
under which it would be rational to assert a proposition with the meaning
of the proposition.
5. Rhoda et al. insist that their view can accommodate the fact that some
aspects of the future are settled and that some statements about the future
are therefore true. Presumably the statement, “The sun will rise tomorrow,” uttered yesterday, would be a paradigmatic example: if this statement can’t lay claim to truth, it’s unclear how there could be any truths
Rhoda et al., “Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future,” 443.
Ibid.,” 436.
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about future events (as opposed to, e.g., 2 + 2’s equaling 4 tomorrow) on
the Peircean semantics. But if God exists, then all bets (including causally
conclusive bets) are off. Since God is free, then barring limitations (e.g.,
promises) he has imposed on himself, nothing about the future is causally
settled, for God could annihilate the world tomorrow. So there won’t be
any true statements about the future. This makes havoc of their claim to
be providing the most plausible interpretation of colloquial usage, since
such usage is filled with claims about the future.
We could add further objections, but the ones just surveyed are sufficient to show the semantic argument to be an unqualified failure.
The Metaphysical Argument
In section IV of their article, Rhoda et al. present a metaphysical argument
for the incompatibility thesis (IT)—“that future contingency is incompatible with a settled future.” They claim that IT follows from the conjunction of the correspondence theory of truth and an A-Theory of time. In
other words, their claim is that the correspondence theory of truth and an
A-Theory of time together entail that there are no true future contingent
propositions.
In order to help us understand the metaphysical argument in support
of this bold assertion, Rhoda et al. provide brief characterizations of the
correspondence theory of truth and A-Theories of time. Unfortunately,
they mischaracterize both of these in ways that vitiate their argument.
“According to the correspondence theory,” they tell us, “a proposition
is true if and only if the state of affairs it posits obtains.”47 This characterization of the correspondence theory is acceptable so long as we do not
press it as a statement of serious metaphysics. There is nothing about the
correspondence theory that commits us ontologically to propositions or
states of affairs (whatever those might be). Unfortunately, Rhoda et al. are
not content to rest with their initial characterization of the correspondence
theory. They supplement the simple theory with controversial addenda
which, as we shall see, play a crucial role in their argument. For example,
they give a quite different characterization of correspondence theory when
they assert that a denial of correspondence is “a rejection of the idea that
true propositions need to be grounded in reality.”48 It is, however, no part
of the correspondence theory of truth that true propositions need to be
grounded in reality. That is the theory of truth-makers, a controversial addendum to correspondence theory that has been defended by a minority
of recent philosophers.49 That truth-maker theory has surreptitiously crept
into the discussion is evident from the idioms of truth-maker theory that
47
Ibid., 447; cf. 446. They stipulate, “In asserting something to be the case, a proposition
posits a state of affairs” (ibid., 40).
48
Ibid., 448.
49
See discussion and literature cited in William Lane Craig, “Middle Knowledge, TruthMakers, and the Grounding Objection,” Faith and Philosophy 18 (2001), 337–352.
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permeate Rhoda et al.’s exposition: they speak of a proposition’s being true
in virtue of what is now the case, of what is required to make a proposition
true, of propositions’ being grounded in present facts, and so on.50 Not only
so, but in holding that true future contingent propositions need to have
truth-makers, they seem to be assuming truth-maker maximalism, an
even mere controversial doctrine defended by a minority of truth-maker
theorists to the effect that there are truth-makers for all true propositions.
As we shall see, Rhoda et al.’s metaphysical argument depends crucially
on truth-maker assumptions. Therefore, their mischaracterizations of the
correspondence theory will prove compromising to their basic argument.
With regard to Rhoda et al.’s characterization of the A- and B-Theories
of time, mischaracterization also takes place, though of a less crucial sort,
which makes their exposition merely sloppy.51 But it is noteworthy how
the idioms of truth-maker theory again creep into the discussion.52
The intrusion of truth-maker assumptions into their discussion of theories of time becomes serious when Rhoda et al., noting that on presentism
there are no non-present states of affairs available to ground the present
truth of true propositions, ask, “How then can propositions about the past
or future be true?”53 The tacit assumption here is that such propositions
require truth-makers, which, as we say, is no part of the correspondence
theory of truth. Hence, it is simply false that “According to the presentist, they are true in virtue of the present obtaining of a tensed state of
affairs.”54 The presentist may say such a thing if he cares to, but he is no
more committed to truth-maker theory than the B-Theorist—which is not
at all. Truth-maker theory is a thesis which is not a necessary condition of
one’s theory of time.
We come, then, to their metaphysical argument for IT. The argument
has two stages. The first stage basically reiterates Rhoda et al.’s discussion
of presentism:
1. A proposition is true iff the state of affairs it posits obtains (correspondence theory of truth).
2. No non-present states of affairs obtain (presentism).
Rhoda et al., “Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future,” 447–448.
E.g., their speaking of “direct accessibility” when they really mean simultaneity, their
confusing sentences with propositions, their handling of states of affairs sometimes as abstract objects which obtain and sometimes as concrete objects which ground the truth of
propositions, and their construing presentism to entail the denial of timeless entities such
as God or mathematical objects and, hence, timelessly obtaining states of affairs in addition
to presently obtaining states of affairs.
52
E.g., on the B-Theory, non-present states of affairs are available to ground the present truth of propositions, propositions about the past or future can be true in virtue of the
past or future obtaining of a tenseless state of affairs, etc. N.B. that the mere availability of
such states on the B-Theory does not imply that the B-Theory is committed to truth-maker
theory.
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3. Therefore, a proposition is true iff the state of affairs it posits obtains
now.
4. Therefore, if there are true [contingent] propositions about the future, they must be true in virtue of the present obtaining of some
future-tense state of affairs.
It is evident that (4) does not validly follow from the premises. For (4) presupposes truth-maker theory, which is not entailed by (1).
Curiously, Rhoda et al. illustrate (4) by stating, “Thus, < A sea battle
will occur tomorrow > is true now if and only if a sea battle’s going to occur tomorrow now obtains.”55 This correctly illustrates what follows from
correspondence theory as they have formulated it, for it states merely
the truth condition of the relevant proposition, not its alleged truth-maker.
Rhoda et al. confuse truth conditions and truth-makers throughout their
article, beginning with their exposition of the “Truth Conditions Argument,” according to which the sentences “It will rain tomorrow” uttered
on Monday and “It rained yesterday” uttered on Wednesday have, in their
words, “exactly the same truth conditions, namely, rain on Tuesday.”56
Rain on Tuesday is not a truth-condition, but a concrete event or entity
which a truth-maker theorist might call upon to serve as the truth-maker
of any number of propositions. Rain falls from the sky and waters the
earth; truth conditions do neither. Similarly, that a sea battle’s going to occur
tomorrow now obtains serves as the truth condition of the relevant proposition, whether or not it has a truthmaker.
The only caveat to be made here is that “going to occur” is a circumlocution forced upon us by the absence in English of any gerundial form
of the future-tense verb. While we can speak of a sea battle’s having occurred yesterday, we cannot intelligibly speak of a sea battle’s willing
occur tomorrow. So we have to advert to “going to occur tomorrow” as
a synonym. This is potentially misleading, since some philosophers of
time use “is going to” as a terminus technicus for present conditions’ being
causally sufficient for some future event and thus emphatically not synonymous with the future-tense. One must take care lest the stated truth
condition for a sea battle will occur tomorrow be taken to imply that the battle
is now determined by present causal conditions.57
In summary, it is open to the correspondence theorist simply to eschew
truth-maker theory and to hold that while adequate truth-conditions for
Ibid., 447 (emphasis in the original).
Ibid., 434.
57
In the closing summary of their argument Rhoda et al. take the aforewarned slide
from asserting “the present truth of < S will obtain > depends entirely on S’s going to obtain
now being the case” to concluding, “< S will obtain > is now true, therefore, if and only if
present conditions are in fact sufficient, that is, fully determinative, of the future obtaining
of S,” where “sufficient” and “determinative” are taken to mean causally sufficient and
causally determinative. But no good reasons have been given for thinking that “S’s going to
obtain” describes a state of affairs which is causally sufficient for S.
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true future contingent propositions can be stated, there just are no truth
makers of such propositions.58 Not only is such a position consistent with
a correspondence theory of truth, but, moreover, Rhoda et al. offer no criticisms of such a position.
The second stage of Rhoda et al.’s argument attempts to show that there
are no true future contingent propositions. It seems to go like this:
5. If a proposition about the future is now true, then it is true in virtue
of what is now the case.
6. What is now the case must somehow bear upon what will be the case.
7. The present bears upon the future in the manner of a cause upon its
effect.
8. Therefore, future-tense states of affairs obtain only insofar as the
future is present in its causes.
This second stage of the argument is unfortunately even more loosely
formulated than the first.
Premise (5) seems to summarize stage 1 and presupposes truth-maker
theory—indeed, a particularly crude version thereof, inasmuch as Rhoda
et al. want to know what the obtaining of a future-tense state of affairs
“could . . . possibly amount to in concrete terms.”59 “How,” they wonder,
“is reality different because some future-tense state of affairs obtains from
what it would have been had that state of affairs not obtained?”60 At one
level such a question is easy to answer: some sentence or proposition has
the property truth inhering in it, God is not wondering what will happen
tomorrow, accurate prophecies may be given of future events, and so on.
But obviously, these are not the sort of differences, real though they may
be, that Rhoda et al. are demanding. They seem to think that the futuretense state of affairs must be itself some sort of concrete, detectable reality.
But such an assumption is manifestly wrong-headed, for manifold kinds
of states of affairs may obtain without concrete, detectable differences of
that sort. Think of ethical states of affairs, for example, such as its being
wrong to torture a child for fun. That state of affairs obtains whether there
even are children or not and whether any that exist ever are tortured. Or
think of mathematical states of affairs involving inaccessible cardinals,
which are so large they do not correspond to any concrete realities. The
idea that truth-makers must be or involve concrete, detectable entities is
clearly false (even if we assume that all truths have truthmakers). So if the
classical theist wants to embrace truth-maker theory in addition to the
58
For a trenchant critique of truth-maker theory, see Trenton Merricks, Truth and Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Merricks takes his denial of truth-maker
maximalism to be incompatible with a view of truth as correspondence, but he understands
correspondence differently than Rhoda et al.
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correspondence theory, and if, moreover, he holds to truth-maker maximalism or has some other reason for thinking future contingent truths
must have truth makers, then there is no reason he may not appeal to
tensed states of affairs which presently obtain as his truth-makers.
Rhoda et al.’s response at this point is to protest that “it begs the question by taking Ockhamism for granted.”61 This retort shows that Rhoda
et al. have lost their way in the argument. It is they who are claiming to
prove that the correspondence theory of truth and an A-Theory of time
jointly entail that there are no true future contingent propositions. To
defeat that claim, the Ockhamist need not prove or even assume that
Ockhamism is true but merely epistemically possible. The Ockhamist
offers an epistemically possible hypothesis on which correspondence,
presentism, and future contingent truth are compatible. It is maladroit
to accuse the Ockhamist of taking his hypothesis for granted. Rather
Rhoda et al. must show the Ockhamist hypothesis (in this case, that the
truth-makers of future contingent propositions are presently obtaining
future-tense states of affairs) is impossible. Instead, they merely muddy
the waters.62
In short, the Ockhamist who is willing to go beyond the correspondence theory of truth and affirm truth-maker theory could accept (5),
taking the truth-makers of future contingent propositions to be presently
obtaining future-tense states of affairs.
Premise (6) comes out of the blue, and no explanation at all is given
of what the italicized locution “bear upon” is supposed to mean. When
Rhoda et al. ask, “How can present reality bear upon a future that does
not yet exist?,”63 they seem to take “bear upon” as roughly synonymous
with “influence” or “determine,” a surmise reinforced by their contention that the “obvious answer” to the question is (7). Now it is no part of
truth-maker theory that truth-makers exert some sort of influence upon
truth-bearers, be these propositions, sentences, or what have you. Nor
does truth-maker theory require truth-makers of future-tense statements
to influence future states of affairs. But no rational motivation apart from
truth-maker theory has been given for (6).
As for (7) only an occasionalist would wish to deny it. But (8) does not
follow from (7). No reason has been given for thinking that only causally

Ibid.
For example, they assert, “On a presentist ontology, presently obtaining future-tense
facts cannot be grounded in future present-tense facts because there are no future facts”
(Rhoda et al., “Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future,” 449). Since
“facts” is being used here in the sense of “states of affairs,” the confused claim is that the
truth-makers need themselves to be further grounded. Moreover, the misgiving expressed
here seems to take grounding to be a causal relation, which by all accounts it is not. Since
the relation between a truth and a truth-maker is not causal, it is not even evident why the
Ockhamist could not take states of affairs which will be actual to be truth-makers of future
contingent propositions.
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determined future-tense states of affairs obtain now. In short, the metaphysical argument is little more than misunderstanding and assertion.
Conclusion
Rhoda et al. want all true, affirmative, future tense propositions to have
the modal status of necessity; any affirmative, future-tense proposition
about a contingent event is therefore false. As we have seen, however,
their attempt to justify such a position over against the standard view is
predicated on confusion about the interpretation of tree diagrams used to
represent the open future view and on semantic and metaphysical arguments which are defective in various ways, including reliance on crude
truth-maker theory and a ham-fisted appeal to “rational assertibility” that
is driven by the demands of their position rather than respect for people’s
actual linguistic behavior.
Tuggy rejects Rhoda et al.’s approach, rightly noting that there are future
tense statements which are explicitly or implicitly committed to, or at least
neutral with respect to, the contingency of future events. Tuggy’s “wide
road” position is that such statements should be treated as neither true
nor false, if the future is indeed now causally open (otherwise they would
be false). Unfortunately, Tuggy, while offering a semantics for this position and defending its consistency, provides little argument in its favor or
against the classic position which accepts Bivalence. His interpretation of
tree diagrams as representative of temporal modalities begs the question
against certain classical theists if such diagrams are to be taken as including events like God’s believing some future contingent proposition.
“Wide is the gate and broad the road which leads to ruin, and many
there are who enter by it,” the Lord warned the crowd in Matthew 7:13. We
believe that the wide road to open theism, and its associated short cut, similarly leads to logical and metaphysical (not to mention theological) ruin.
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